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The epidemiological transition, the shift from infectious to chronic non-communicable diseases
(NCDs), is well advanced in most European countries. Viewed from one perspective, we can understand this by focusing on changes to people’s lifestyles and behaviors. However, a contrasting view
draws attention to broader, social and environmental features that are unfavorable to health. The
World Health Organization (WHO) slogan “Make the healthy choice the easier choice” attempts
to bridge these two views. It not only recognizes the choices that individuals have in consuming
healthier products or taking exercise but also seems to acknowledge that consumer “choices” are
heavily influenced by other factors beyond the individual’s power. Among these factors are the strategies that corporations pursue to make unhealthy choices more likely. Thus, public health is inevitably
confronted with the question of how to interact with commercial interests when it comes to tackling
the NCD epidemic.
The engagement of public health practitioners and researchers with tobacco industry is now
highly controversial leading many scholars to eschew interactions with the industry (1). Reflecting
this, many leading journals now refuse to publish tobacco industry funded research (2). Yet, many
public health officials consider dealing with the processed food, soft drink, and alcohol industries
as normal practice, treating them as legitimate partners in improving population health (3). What
is the rationale behind such different approaches to dealing with these industries, given that their
products have a significant adverse impact on population health and their business strategies use
similar approaches when it comes to marketing, product design, policy influence, and challenging
evidence of harm (4, 5)?
In part, the answer lies in the extensive research linking the consumption of tobacco products
to a range of negative health outcomes and the activities of the tobacco industry (4). As a result of
a series of internal leaks followed by litigation against major tobacco companies in the US, internal
tobacco company documents have entered the public realm (6). These highlight that senior managers
of tobacco companies have (among other things): lied about how addictive tobacco products are,
worked to increase the addictiveness of products; targeted young children as new product “markets”;
and worked to restrain policies that aim to limit tobacco consumption and the influence of tobacco
companies [see, e.g., Ref. (7)]. These revelations led to the conceptualization of the tobacco industry
as a key NCD “vector” (4). Public health efforts to denormalize tobacco have effectively undermined
public and political legitimacy of tobacco industry actors in selected policy contexts, where industry
representatives are increasingly excluded from tobacco control debates (8). However, the growing
popularity of e-cigarettes is threatening the cohesion of the movement to control tobacco and
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offering new avenues through which tobacco industry actors can
access policy makers (9).
Processed food, alcohol, and soft drink industries tend to
argue (as the tobacco industry used to claim) that it is the
individual’s personal responsibility to choose healthier options,
for example, by exercising, eating healthy diets, and reducing
the intake of less healthy products. The CEO of PepsiCo, Indra
Nooyi, has, for example, argued that PepsiCo is an “ethical”
company. She pointed out that her company offers a selection
of products, ranging from healthy to less healthy. This view is
frequently reinforced through advertising, news stories and
television programs and, in many cases, government policies.
From this perspective, considering the corporate interests
relating to the production and marketing of products as social
determinants of NCDs makes sense. However, these actors often
portray themselves as “part of the solution” (10) to the health
crises that their products exacerbate. Thus, the development of
reformulated products, changes to labeling, support for “educational” initiatives, and the implementation of self-regulatory
codes of practice are framed as appropriate strategies toward
the control of NCDs.
The health harms associated with the tobacco, alcohol, and
processed food industries are significant. Research shows that
alcohol and obesity contribute significantly to unfavorable health
outcomes (e.g., in pregnancy), often in a magnitude comparable
to that of tobacco (4, 11). Evidence also suggests that the healthrelated costs of products across these industries are similar and
are perhaps highest for obesity (4, 12), rather than for tobacco. It
is also clear that commercial interests and strategies across these
sectors are similar, with industry representatives actively working
to influence public and policy debates with a view to minimize
the potential for regulation and maximize profit. Three examples
suffice as follows:

food, soft drinks, and alcohol industries? It may be, as Collin (1)
argues – partly a consequence of the success of the tobacco control movement in promoting “tobacco exceptionalism” – the
idea that the tobacco industry – as a result of both the health
costs of tobacco products and our knowledge about prior
industry behavior – requires a uniquely strict approach to protecting public health policy from the interference of industry.
Although it may be argued that tobacco is a uniquely harmful
product – when used precisely as intended by manufacturers,
tobacco will kill 50% of long-term users – a growing body of
research suggests that the industry which produces it is far
from unique as a vector of disease. Given the magnitude of
the public health challenge posed by NCDs, we need to move
beyond identifying the current, contradictory approaches to
these different industries. We propose four priorities for public
health research. They should help us to better comprehend how
these key industries are perceived, and how they influence the
way politics and the public accepts them and their strategies.
Researchers must:
1. develop tools to better understand how processed food, soft
drinks, and alcohol industries influence public, media, political, and policy debates,
2. examine how policymakers, journalists, and the public view
each of these industries and the products they market, and
why,
3. consider how research in this area might support policies
that are effective and evidence informed, and will contribute
toward promoting and protecting the public’s health, and
4. investigate the complex network of actors that constitute
each of these distinct industries and identify any interactions
between them. In this way, we can elucidate interests, strategies, and actions that are common across industries.

• Recent research examining how alcohol industry actors in the
UK have attempted to block policy proposals for minimum
unit pricing identify strategies for policy influence that have
been widely used by the tobacco industry, including efforts
to shape the available evidence base (and the public’s, the
media’s, and policymakers’ understandings of the available
evidence), direct and indirect lobbying, links to more credible
organizations such as think tanks, and efforts to shape public
perceptions of the industry (13), often via the media (14).
• Corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies are employed
across all of these industries as means of shaping political
contexts and informing public perceptions and consumption
patterns. Despite these efforts to enhance their credibility,
however, soda companies behave irresponsibly, for example,
by explicitly targeting children and setting goals to increase
consumption (15).
• In 2009–2012, a coalition of more than 50 food and beverage
companies in the US invested US-$175 million to successfully
lobby the Obama Administration not to pursue tougher (albeit
still voluntary) nutritional standards for food items marketed
to children (5).

In moving this agenda forward, public health researchers need
to make space for developing “charismatic ideas” – convincing
alternative scenarios of a healthier future (5). This is necessary to
identify possibilities and new avenues to reduce harmful corporate influences on health.
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